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Abstract—Skill verification is a central problem in workforce
hiring. Companies and academia often face the difficulty of
ascertaining the skills of an applicant since the certifications of
the skills claimed by a candidate are generally not immediately
verifiable and costly to test. Blockchains have been proposed in
the literature for skill verification and tamper-proof information
storage in a decentralized manner. However, most of these
approaches deal with storing the certificates issued by traditional
universities on the blockchain. Among the few techniques that
consider the certification procedure itself, questions like (a) scal-
ability with limited staff, (b) uniformity of grades over multiple
evaluators, or (c) honest effort extraction from the evaluators are
usually not addressed. We propose a blockchain-based platform
named SkillCheck, which considers the questions above, and
ensure several desirable properties. The platform incentivizes
effort in grading via payments with tokens which it generates
from the payments of the users of the platform, e.g., the recruiters
and test takers. We provide a detailed description of the design of
the platform along with the provable properties of the algorithm.
Index Terms—skill verification, blockchains, strategic graders,
honest effort
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has seen an unprecedented growth
after being introduced in 2008. First used as a peer-to-peer
ledger for registering the transactions, it has seen its own
technological development as well as its adoption in various
applications. It is desirable in many applications primarily
because it eliminates any third-party intermediary and allows
users to make their transactions directly. In a blockchain, each
node in a decentralized network of peer nodes (1) holds a
replica of a common ledger, (2) writes an entry to its own
ledger when it has agreement from the other nodes in the
network, (3) broadcasts any transaction made by its user to
the other nodes in the network, and (4) checks, on a regular
basis, that the ledger it holds is identical to the ones across
the network [1].
On another hand, the rapid development of the online edu-
cation, powered by the massive open online courses (MOOC),
has also seen an unprecedented growth. In the process of this
growth, it needed some of the properties that are ubiquitous
in the blockchains, most notably, (i) the absence of a central
authority and (ii) verifiable certifications. Skill certification
today demands need-based skills to be certified which is a
little difficult to come by in a standard university system. For
instance, a course on android app development may not find
This work is supported by the IIT Kanpur fund number cs/2017198.
a place in a university curricula, while a student skilled in
that may be indispensable for certain organizations. Yet, the
organization has to hire the student uncertified or has to test
the skill by itself, which is expensive.
To bridge this gap and to provide skill certification on
demand, the need for blockchains in education has emerged
[15]. This need is also reflected in the European commission
policy report [6], which agrees that the blockchain applications
in education is still at infancy, and recommends that
To ensure development of open blockchain imple-
mentations we recommend that the EU in collabora-
tion with Member States consider creating and pro-
moting a label for ‘open’ educational records, which
enshrines the principles of recipient ownership, ven-
dor independence, and decentralised verification.
The literature on application of blockchains in education is
heavy with the management of certificates issued by the
standard authorities. A survey by Alammary et al. [1] shows
that almost 41% of the systematically surveyed articles dealt
with this issue. However, a major impediment to the skill
certification is to get the right instructor and evaluators that
can certify the skills of candidates. This is a challenging
task since there is little work in this domain that study the
quality of the certificates or on ensuring the best effort of the
evaluators. In this paper, we take an incentive-based approach
for the different players in the education blockchain network
and investigate what guarantees are possible to provide in the
quality of certifications.
A. Our contributions
We propose a blockchain-based education platform called
SkillCheck, which handles large classes with limited num-
ber of teaching staff, provides uniformity of grades, and
ensures honest effort from the evaluators. This platform can
be implemented inside a university or an organization, or
can be implemented by onboarding multiple universities or
organizations on a single large blockchain. It allows any user
to offer a course according to the need-based skill certifications
of the other users. Hence, it has the flexibility of designing
and certifying non-traditional courses in an asynchronous
manner, i.e., the beginning or end does not need to align
with any semester/quarter. The instructor can choose a set of
evaluators in the blockchain network who are skilled in that
topic, e.g., individuals who have been certified in the same
system earlier. SkillCheck uses crypo-tokens for transferring
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credit for good evaluation to the evaluators (Section II). The
underlying mechanism of SkillCheck ensures that the rewards
of evaluation is designed such that the individual biases of
evaluators have no effect in the final score received by the
candidate. Therefore, it is ensuring uniform grading of the
papers. Also, the mechanism ensures that if an evaluator
exerts effort to reduce her noise of grading, her pay-off
increases (Theorem 1). We provide layer-wise divisions of
the functionalities of the platform (Section III) and a detailed
description of the implementation of the platform (Section IV)
so that it is reproducible.
The complete details are available in the full version of the
paper [8].
B. Related work
The nascent research area of blockchains in education can
be classified in many strands. Here we will discuss about two
largest strands. The first strand is focused towards certificates
management [5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14], which is a secure decen-
tralized way to store the traditional university certificates. Our
work is closest to the second strand of literature that deals with
the management of skill or competencies [3, 4, 9, 10, 14, 15,
17]. These works focus on generating the competencies based
on the evaluations of the evaluators. However, the evaluators
are assumed to be honest graders and there is no normalization
of the scores given by different evaluators, if used. Alammary
et al. [1] provide a nice classification of the literature based on
their category of applications. The literature, however, is thin
on the algorithmic guarantees on competencies of the evalu-
ators. Our approach fills this important gap with a platform
with provable algorithmic guarantees for skill certification.
II. DESIGN WORKFLOW
The basic platform of skill certification in this paper is a
blockchain with users who can have exactly one of the four
roles at any given instant: (a) the instructor, who designs
and conducts an exam, sets the guidelines of grading, and
also partially grades answerscripts, (b) the evaluators, who are
individuals with sufficient expertise in the topics of the exam
– they can be past creditors of the course, (c) the candidates
seeking certification, (d) the viewers of the certificates, e.g.,
the recruiters who are looking for individuals of a certain
skill. We assume that the number of candidates is quite large
for the instructor to check. Therefore, he needs evaluators,
e.g., the teaching assistants, who help him grading the papers.
However, the evaluators may spend little or no effort in
the grading carefully, which can lead to a bad quality of
certification. So, in such a context of decentralized evaluation
and certification, we need certain desirable properties of any
platform, given as follows.
• Scalability: the platform should handle a large number of
candidates.
• Uniformity of scores: if the scores are given by different
evaluators having different degrees of noise, it is necessary
that the final grade is normalized in some way to ensure
uniformity of the grades.
• Honest effort extraction: evaluators must be incentivized to
maximize their effort in grading the papers.
The certification obtained via this platform will always be
stored in a blockchain. Therefore, the properties like veri-
fiability, absence of a central repository of certificates, and
authenticity of the records are inherited by default, and are
not mentioned as separate desiderata.
To ensure the desirable properties, our approach is to exploit
the fact that a grading mechanism (a) can have some instructor-
graded answer-scripts (which we call probes) to measure the
quality of the evaluators, and (b) allow students to raise a
regrading request for incorrect grades which can be corrected
by the instructor. Hence, eventually all ‘true’ grades of the
papers, where the ‘given’ scores are below the ‘true’ scores,
will be obtained, and this information will be used to deter the
evaluators from deliberately under-performing. Our approach
is inspired by the TRUPEQA mechanism [2], but modified
for our setting.
In the following, we outline the functional structures of our
proposed platform SkillCheck. We will discuss the model of
the evaluation process and the provable properties it satisfies
in subsequent sections.
SkillCheck token. Crypto tokens are well-known holdings in
the crypto space and are usually called cryptocurrency in the
blockchain parlance. It is a standard currency which is used
to make and receive payments on a blockchain network. In
contrast to fiat currency, crypto tokens are a special kind of
virtual representation of a particular asset or utility, that reside
on the blockchain network.
In our setting, all four types of users of SkillCheck will have
individual wallets attached to their account, which contain the
amount SkillCheck tokens that user (represented by a node
in the network) hold, and individual portfolios showing their
skill score and evaluation scores (relevant for the candidates
and evaluators) that constitute their certificates. The skill score
shows the knowledge of the candidates on a subject and
evaluation score reflects the evaluator’s skill in grading an
answersheet. To begin with, the wallets can be recharged by
converting fiat currency into the tokens. However, we propose
to waive the transaction costs of the evaluators, since they are
the workforce for the SkillCheck platform.
The examiners and candidates pay SkillCheck tokens as
a fee to conduct any examination and to get certified respec-
tively. The evaluators also need to pay a small threshold token
to enroll themselves as an evaluator. The total collected token
(from initial token charged to the examiner and small token
paid by the evaluators) will be distributed to evaluators based
on the evaluation score that evaluator will earn by grading the
papers. The steps of the workflow of SkillCheck is given as
follows (see Figure 1).
In step 1, an examiner submits an exam on blockchain
network by calling a public function to create a new copy
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Fig. 1. The workflow diagram in SkillCheck.
of a Smart Contract1 (SC). Placing an examination on the
blockchain costs him some fixed number of tokens. After-
wards, the paid token for the submission is locked within
the SC. Users’ wallets associated with the blockchain network
contains the portfolio in which users will have skill and evalua-
tion scores, along with SkillCheck token which can be earned
by evaluating papers or purchasing from the system. Once
the question paper of the exam is on the blockchain network,
eligible candidates can enroll themselves in examination by
calling the public function of the SC. The students have to go
to the local examination centre for giving the exam.
In step 2, candidates and evaluators enroll themselves using
their public keys.
In step 3, the examination will be conducted at a test
center to prevent identity theft. Every candidate gets a fixed
number of maximum attempts to get themselves certified. The
candidates need to solve the paper and submit the responses
by calling the private function of the SC, which ensures the
prevention of data leakage threat. The SC will contain all
pooled answers of candidates.
In step 4, the examiner checks a constant number of
answerscripts that constitutes the probe papers. This is needed
as our algorithm (explained in Section III-B) needs the probes
1A smart contract, also known as a cryptocontract , is a computer program
that directly controls the transfer of digital currencies or assets between parties
under certain conditions. An algorithm can be encoded into a smart contract
which automates the payment process.
to estimate the accuracies of the evaluators. The scores of the
probe papers are assumed to be benchmarks as it is graded by
the instructor. A distribution strategy is implemented in the SC
that distribute sets of papers to all evaluators. Every evaluation
gets an equal mix of anonymous probe and non-probe papers.
The evaluators check the papers assigned to them and submit
their scores for the assigned papers. A small gas price for
this evaluation transaction is charged to the evaluators. This
price is a constant and is later reimbursed by the platform. The
evaluators need to call the SC function and submit evaluated
marks to contract.
In step 5, our algorithm computes the skill scores of the
candidates participating in the exam. The scores are shared
with the candidates.
In step 6, the candidates can raise a regrading request if
they feel the scores are unfair. The paper is then checked by
the instructor to find the “true” score. Our algorithm keeps
a penalty for frivolous regrading requests to entertain only
reasonable regrading requests. Due to the properties of our
algorithm, which we prove later, the number of regrading
requests are expected to be small.
In step 7, based on the evaluations of the instructor on
the papers that went through the regrading process and the
papers for which there were not any regrading request, the
final skill scores of the candidates and the evaluation scores
of the evaluators are updated in the SC. For the papers that
did not raise any regrading request, the final score is the score
given by the algorithm in step 5.
Step 8 computes an appropriate distribution of collected to-
ken from evaluators and examiner and the SC will transfer the
collected tokens to evaluators. The skill scores are registered
in the profile of the candidates via the SC.
In step 9, the viewers, e.g., the recruiters, can view the skill
and evaluation scores of the users by paying tokens.
III. LAYER-WISE DESIGN OF SkillCheck
Since the development of the platform SkillCheck needs
all functionalities of a blockchain environment to be imple-
mented, it is often easier to break them down into multiple
layers of specific functionalities. We follow the layered struc-
ture given by Yuan and Wang [16]. In this section, we provide
a detailed view of the first three layers, i.e., the application,
contract, and incentive layers. For the rest of the layers, i.e.,
the consensus, network, data, and physical layers, we use the
standard implementation of the Ethereum framework and its
default configuration. Figure 2 shows the layered architecture
of our proposed platform.
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Fig. 2. Layered architecture of the SkillCheck platform.
A. Application Layer
This layer deals with the application of skill verification
of users, authentication of certificates issued by the various
institutes using blockchain networking, and stores the tokens
in the user wallets. In the SkillCheck platform, this layer deals
with the development of the user interface that shows their
profile with (a) the certificates issued by the platform, (b) the
coins in the wallet, and (c) the roles that they can take–e.g.,
instructor, candidate, evaluator, or recruiter.
B. Contract Layer
This layer mainly consists of various scripts for func-
tionalities, which serve as a necessary means to communi-
cate with the whole network, including blocks stored in the
blockchain. This layer also implements the central algorithm
of SkillCheck. The algorithm and functionalities are encoded
into a smart contract, which is a group of self-authenticating,
self-administering, and self-driving quick response rule sys-
tem that is stored on the blockchain. To present the central
algorithm of SkillCheck, we develop the basic notation.
The notation and the desiderata are similar to the properties
mentioned in [2]. However, unlike [2], here the evaluation of
the papers are done by evaluators who are different from the
test takers.
1) Setup: Each candidate interested in getting certified
has written an exam that needs to be evaluated. Let N =
{1, . . . , n} represent the set of the candidates and M =
{1, . . . ,m} denote the set of evaluators. We use i as the index
for an evaluator and j as the index for a paper (of a candidate).
Out of the n total papers, `(<< n) papers are evaluated by
the instructor and these papers are called the probe papers.
We assume that through this grading process, the true grades
of these probe papers are known to the designer (e.g., the
instructor of the course). The scores belong to a closed interval
S ⊂ R.
An evaluation mechanism E is the tuple 〈G, r, t〉, where
• G is an assignment function G :M 7→ 2N that maps papers
to evaluators. The set of papers graded by i is G−1(i) ,
{j ∈ N : i ∈ G(j)}.
• r : ×i∈NSG(i) → Sn, where the jth component rj(·) is the
function assigning the skill score of candidate j based on
the scores reported by the assigned evaluators.
• t : ×i∈NSG(i) → Sn, where ti(·) is the function that yields
the evaluation score to evaluator i.
The set Pi ⊂ G−1(i) and NPi = G−1(i) \Pi denotes respec-
tively the probe and non-probe papers assigned to i. We define
the co-evaluators of individual i as CGi = ∪j∈NPiG(j)\{i},
i.e., the set of evaluators who grade at least one common non-
probe paper with i.
2) Model of true and reported scores: We assume that
the generation of the true scores and the error model of
the evaluators is given by the PG1 model of evaluator bias
and reliability as described in Piech et al. [12], described as
follows.
• The true score yj for paper j is distributed as N (µ, 1/γ),
for all j ∈ N . The parameters of this distribution are learned
from the historical data of examinations.
• The reported score of paper j by evaluator i, given by y˜(i)j ,
is distributed as N (yj+bi, 1/τi), where bi and τi are called
the bias and reliability of i respectively.
The bias term may be interpreted as either strategic (manip-
ulating grades in a particular direction consciously) or non-
strategic (subconsciously generous or strict evaluators). We
assume that an evaluator can choose her reliability in the
grading process. Intuitively, bias resembles to what extent
the evaluator is shifting the mean of the score and reliability
denotes how much effort she is putting in to find the score
accurately. A crucial assumption here is that an evaluator
grades all papers in an exam (particularly, the probes and non-
probes) with the same bias and reliability. We believe that
this assumption is not too restrictive in an environment where
the evaluators cannot distinguish the probes from the non-
probes (as they are given a mix of them without mentioning
the distinction). We use the shorthand θi := (bi, τi) ∈ R×R>0,
where bi (potentially) and τi are evaluator i’s strategic choices.
3) Description of our mechanism 〈G∗, r∗, t∗〉: The compo-
nents of our evaluation mechanism 〈G∗, r∗, t∗〉 are as follows.
Let K be an even predetermined number of papers each
evaluator grades. This number is an exogenous design choice
of the platform.
a) Paper assignment rule G∗(·): We impose (a) G∗(j) 6=
∅, ∀j ∈ N , (b) |Pi| = K/2, ∀i ∈ M , and (c) |NPi| =
K/2, ∀i ∈ M , i.e., every paper is graded by at least one
evaluator, and every evaluator grades K/2 probes and K/2
non-probe papers. The evaluators know the numbers of probe
and non-probe papers assigned to them, but cannot tell them
apart.
b) Skill and evaluation scores: Once the evaluators
scores are collected, our mechanism statistically estimates the
error parameters θˆi : S|Pi|×|Pi| 7→ R×R>0 of each evaluator
i, from the comparison between reported grades y˜(i)j s and
true grades yjs on the probe papers Pi. In our particular
case, this is given by θˆi = (bˆi, τˆi), and bˆi =
∑
j∈Pi y˜
(i)
j −yj
|Pi|
and τˆi =
|Pi|−1∑
j∈Pi (y˜
(i)
j −(yj+bˆi))2
. Below we describe how the
estimated parameters are used in generating the skill scores of
the candidates and the evaluation scores to evaluators.
DEFINITION 1 (Score computing mechanism): We define a
specific score computing rule that would be used in aggre-
gating the evaluator-reported-scores into a final score on each
exam. We also define a social welfare criteria that would be
used to describe the evaluation scores.
• The score computing function r∗ = (r∗j : j ∈ N) of
an evaluation mechanism E is inverse standard-deviation
weighted de-biased mean (ISWDM) if it assigns the
instructor-verified grade on every probe paper. For every
non-probe paper j, it assigns
r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , θˆG(j)) =
√
γµ+
∑
i∈G(j)
√
τˆi(y˜
(i)
j − bˆi)√
γ +
∑
i∈G(j)
√
τˆi
.
where y˜(i)j is the score assigned by the ith evaluator and
(bˆi, τˆi) are the parameters we estimated for her.
• The scores r∗ are released to the candidates, and they can
raise a regrading request if they feel the score is unfair. The
instructor checks the paper in such a case and decides the
final score yj , which we assume to be the true score of
the paper. If candidate j do not raise a regrading request,
the mechanism assumes the true score to be r∗j . Here we
can explicitly say that the total effort(in checking all papers
himself) made by the instructor, has been reduced by a
substantial amount. 2
2To avoid the case where every candidate may raise a regrading request
(because it does not hurt), we can impose penalties for frivolous requests.
This threat mechanism works well in practice and has been part of various
online grading tools.
• The social welfare at a score r∗j for paper j when the true
score is yj is denoted by
W ∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , θˆG(j), yj) = R(r
∗
j (y˜
G(j)
j , θˆG(j)), yj).
where y˜G(j)j is the vector of evaluated scores reported
on paper j, and θˆG(j) is the vector of estimated error-
parameters for the relevant evaluators G(j).
We assume that R(x, x) = 0 ≥ R(x, y) = R(y, x) for all
x, y ∈ S, and R(x1, y1) > R(x2, y2) if |x1−y1| < |x2−y2|.
One example of such a function would be R(x, y) = −(x−
y)2, which calculates the squared error in assigned scores.
• The social welfare at a score r∗j for paper j without
evaluator i when the true score is yj is denoted by
W
(−i)∗
j = W
∗
j (y˜
G(j)\{i}
j , θˆG(j)\{i}, yj) where W
∗
j (·) is
defined as before.
• The evaluation score of evaluator i for grading paper j ∈
NPi is given by t
j,∗
i = α(W
∗
j − W (−i)∗j ), where α > 0
is a constant chosen at the designer’s discretion. The total
transfer to evaluator i is therefore t∗i =
∑
j∈NPi t
j,∗
i .
The parameters γ, µ, bi, and τi are from the PG1 model of
Piech et al. [12] as defined at the end of Section III-B2.
We will use the shorthands W ∗j and W
(−i)∗
j for the above
two expressions when the arguments of such functions are
clear from the context.
4) Incentives and design desiderata: In this section, we
describe the preferences of the population participating in the
mechanism. A candidate j can get only skill scores, r∗j or
yj . Her strategy to improve this score is via putting more
effort in getting the answers correct and raise correct regrading
requests. Hence there is no strategic aspect in a candidate
strategy. An evaluator i, however, can have a conscious or
unconscious bias bi and can choose the amount of effort,
represented via the reliability τi, that she can exert to grade
the papers assigned to her. The pay-off (we use pay-off and
utility interchangeably in this paper) of the evaluator is the
evaluation score t∗i . Depending on how t
∗
i is related to the bias
and reliabilities, evaluator i can choose those two parameters
to maximize her incentive. This is where the incentive design
question is important. Denote the utility of evaluator i by
u
(G∗,r∗,t∗)
i (bi, τi, b−i, τ−i) = t
∗
i .
3
The objective of the SkillCheck platform is to ensure that
the evaluation is done with uniformity of skill scores and
by extracting honest effort from the evaluators. Hence the
following properties are desirable in such a setting.
A few different uncertainties are resolved after the evaluator
i chooses her decision variables (bi, τi), and before r∗ and t∗
are computed. These are: (1) the scores finally reported by
this evaluator i, which on any paper j, follow the distribution
f(y˜
(i)
j |yj) ∼ N (yj + b′i, 1/τi), (2) the decision variables
(bk, τk) chosen by every co-evaluator k, (3) the true score
yj on paper j, (4) the scores finally reported by a co-
evaluator k, which on any paper j follow the distribution
f(y˜
(k)
j |yj) ∼ N (yj + bk, 1/τk), conditional on the decision
3The notation ‘−i’ denotes all the evaluators except i.
variables (bk, τk). The properties defined below consider the
evaluator i’s expected utility from the choice of strategies
she makes, where the expectation is only being taken with
respect to the distribution of i’s grade-evaluation process
f(y˜
(i)
j |yj) ∼ N (yj + bi, 1/τi),∀j ∈ G−1(i), and they hold
for any realization of the other uncertainties (2) to (4).
DEFINITION 2 (Ex-Post Bias Insensitivity (EPBI)): An eval-
uation mechanism E = 〈G, r, t〉 is ex-post bias insensitive,
if the expected utility of every evaluator i ∈ M , where
expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of i’s
grade-evaluation process, is independent of the bias bi. This
holds irrespective of the biases and reliabilities chosen by
the other evaluators k 6= i, and the realized value of the
true score yj and reported scores of the different evaluators.
Mathematically, for all {y˜(k), bk, τk}k 6=i
E
y˜
(i)
G−1(i)|yG−1(i)
u
(G,r,t)
i (bi, τi, b−i, τ−i)
= E
y˜
(i)
G−1(i)|yG−1(i)
u
(G,r,t)
i (b
′
i, τi, b−i, τ−i). (1)
EPBI ensures that the expected utility of a evaluator is in-
sensitive to her bias for (a) every realization of the random
variables governing the true and reported scores, (b) the bias,
reliabilities chosen by the other evaluators, and (c) her own
reliability. The next property discusses the dependency with
reliability.
DEFINITION 3 (Ex-Post Reliability Monotonicity (EPRM)):
An evaluation mechanism E = 〈G, r, t〉 is ex-post reliability
monotone if for every evaluator i, the utility is monotonically
non-decreasing with her reliability irrespective of the biases
and reliabilities chosen by the other evaluators and the re-
alizations of the true scores and the scores reported by the
different evaluators. Mathematically, for all {y˜(k), bk, τk}k 6=i
E
y˜
(i)
G−1(i)|yG−1(i)
u
(G,r,t)
i (bi, τi, b−i, τ−i)
> E
y˜
(i)
G−1(i)|yG−1(i)
u
(G,r,t)
i (bi, τ
′
i , b−i, τ−i),∀τi > τ ′i . (2)
Note that these properties are stronger than a similar definition
in dominant strategies. Since there are random variables like
the true scores y and the reported scores y˜ respectively, and
they can change the utility expression, a dominant strategy
definition will only require the (in)equalities to be satisfied
after taking interim expectation over some relevant distribution
over those variables. However, the ex-post properties require
them to be satisfied for every realization of these random
variables.
Our central result on the proposed evaluation mechanism is
as follows. We defer the proof to the appendix for a cleaner
presentation.
THEOREM 1 (Bias and Reliability): Mechanism (G∗, r∗, t∗)
is EPBI and EPRM.
This result ensures that any rational evaluator should not
put any bias to the evaluations and work at their highest
reliability. The (G∗, r∗, t∗) mechanism forms the backbone
of SkillCheck. Hence the platform satisfies the properties as
that of this mechanism. In the next layer, we discuss how the
incentives of the evaluators are implemented.
C. Incentive Layer
Incentive layer is designed to incorporate the rewards to
the participants (the evaluators in our case) to satisfy the
objectives of the blockchain network. In SkillCheck, the
desirable properties are EPBI and EPRM. These are obtained
through the award of the evaluation score ti to evaluator
i ∈M . Our platform transfers ti amount of tokens to evaluator
i, which they can convert to fiat currency. However, we need
to ensure that the platform does not run into an overall loss
after such transfers. The platform earns the tokens from the
payments of (a) the candidates who are willing to get certified,
(b) the recruiters, who wants to view the certificates of the
candidates, and (c) the instructor, who needs to pay to offer a
course on SkillCheck. Let the collective amount from all the
tokens received in these way is Knet. SkillCheck ensures that
the expected sum of transfers, i.e., E(
∑
i∈M ti), is below Knet,
where the expectation is taken over the prior distribution of the
skill scores, evaluators’ error distributions, and the observed
scores of the evaluators. The distributions can be obtained
from the historical data of the course. We call this property
expected budget balance, which can be achieved by setting the
parameter α in the expression of tji based on the Knet and the
expected value of the sum of the evaluation scores.
For a practical implementation, the estimate of α may be
set conservatively, i.e., that ensures that the Knet is less likely
to get exhausted. However, the choice of α for a specific exam
needs to be derived empirically using the available historical
information of that exam.
The rest of the layers are implemented according to any
standard protocol of blockchain platforms used in practice. We
follow the implementation of the Ethereum and the details are
given in the next section.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATION
To implement SkillCheck, we use the Rinkeby Test net-
work provided by the Ethereum Foundation. In the current
implementation, we have used the Ethereum private network
to establish a blockchain system. We have used Solidity to
perform the primary functionality of a smart contract (SC).
Every action in the platform SkillCheck, e.g., checking the
probe papers by the instructor, evaluations of the answerscripts
by the evaluators, raising regrading requests by the candidates,
and assignment of final skill and evaluation scores by the
instructor, is considered a transaction, which is executed via
a cryptographically signed contract that runs on the net-
work. The codes for full implementation can be found at:
https://github.com/jaygpt/Skillcheck.
The implementation of SkillCheck is divided into three
main segments: (1) the front-end that deals with the user
interface, (2) the smart contracts where the algorithms are
implemented, and (3) the back-end which connects SkillCheck
to the Ethereum blockchain. These components are explained
as follows.
Enrollment	
address[] public students;
mapping(address=>string) names;
mapping(address => address) wallet;
mapping(address => bool) doyouhavewallet;
+ function createwallet(string) public{}
+ function totalwallet() public view returns
(address[])
+ function mywallet() public view returns
(string)
Wallet
address public student;
uint score;
uint testevaluatingscore;
address admin;
+ function Setadmin(address
examiner) public
+ function Wallet(address )
public
+ function setscoretest(uint ) public
+ function setscoreeval(....) public
+ function presentscore() public view
returns
+ function myaddress() public view
returns(address)
Exam	Factory
address[] myaddress;
mapping(address => string)
Instructions;
+ function creatorTest(string) public
+ function creatorTest(string ) public
+ function totalwallet() public view
returns (address[])
+ function totalinstruction(address)
public view returns(string)
Exam
mapping(address => bool) public attende;
struct Marksbyme{address, int[]};
mapping(address => Marksbyme[]) grading;
address[] studentswallet;
address examiner;
string[] public Questionset;
struct questionanswer{string, string, int}
mapping(address => questionanswer[]) public exam;
+ function addProbe(address, uint , int) public restricted
+ function Test(address creator) public{}
+ function addQuestion(string question) public restricted{}
+ function enrollintest(address walletaddress) public{}
+ function starteval(address walletaddress) public{}
+ function answermytest(address walletaddress,uint index,string answer) public{}
+ function becomegrader(address walletaddress, address roll) public{}
+ function givemarks(address roll, address Mywallet, int marks,uint index) restricted2  public {}
+ class examinerAuthority(address , address , int ,uint ) restricted2  private {}
Smart contract to
create new test
SC needs to execute at
enrollment
COLLEGE (SMART
CONTRACT)
TEST (SMART CONTRACT)
Fig. 3. Overview of the smart contracts of SkillCheck.
Front End Decentralized Application
Back end(Network)
Web3
Web3 response
JSON RPC Protocol
Fig. 4. The architecture of SkillCheck.
A. Back-end
Like most of the Ethereum’s decentralized application
(DApp), SkillCheck also has Node.js as its backend frame-
work. We have used a combination of Node.js and MongoDB
to maintain the database and to manage the connection be-
tween the database and the blockchain interactions and to
display using our frontend and render methods. However,
SkillCheck uses web3.js JavaScript library which allows the
client-side to interact with the blockchain including a local
or a remote Ethereum node, using a HTTP or inter-process
communication (IPC) connection. This system is more secure
than a general web application as the user does not need to
give control of her private keys to the service provider, which
is not possible in a web application. Moreover, the interaction
with the portfolio and the wallet, where the tokens are stored,
is administered only by the client-side.
B. Front-end
As a blockchain works primarily on the client-side, it is
essential to have a proper interface for interacting with the
Ethereum blockchain directly. Any DApp is similar to a web
application in multiple ways. Using various JavaScript web
technologies, an easy-to-use interface supports SkillCheck
Rinkeby blockchain/off-chain interaction. MetaMask, that al-
lows us to run Ethereum DApps in the browser without
running a full Ethereum node, is used for submitting responses
to an SC, to create a response sheet to the SC by the evaluator
and other user-friendly interfaces. Truffle framework is used
to create a new wallet and Ganache-CLI is used for Ethereum
blockchain simulation. ReactJS (a JavaScript library) is used
for building user interfaces especially for the single page
applications such as the enrolment page.
C. Smart Contract and Ethereum
An abstract description of the SkillCheck SCs is given in
Figure 3. Each block in the figure depicts two segments: the
first shows the objects needed for the SC, and the second
part shows the functions used in the SC. Using the standard
web3.js JavaScript library, SkillCheck implements the generic
JSON Remote Procedure Call (RPC) specification providing
a convenient interface for the RPC methods. The DApp can
be accessed through a regular web browser with an extension
of MetaMask. The MetaMask connects our DAPP to the main
blockchain provided by Ethereum. The MetaMask extension
utilizes the web3.js API to an injected web3 object, which
can be used to access blockchain using asynchronous methods
calls.
The SkillCheck token contract is an ERC-20 token. The
ERC-20 token is a standard for implementing SCs on the
Ethereum blockchain. The following two sections describe the
SCs we use in SkillCheck.
1) College: This segment of contracts contains two con-
tracts, enrolment and wallet, that are all sub-standards of the
ERC-20 token. In the enrolment contract, various function-
alities like sign-up and creation of wallets are implemented.
The wallet contract is generated by the enrolment contract.
Together, they are analogous to the admission process of
an institute, where each student/teacher/evaluator gets an ID
card having various functionalities. The whole platform uses
SkillCheck tokens, which is the currency of the payment
service, and allows paying the transaction costs (gas) in these
tokens instead of the Ether. The wallet contract has all the
functionalities of a usual Ethereum wallet. The wallet has the
unique function of setting an admin role who can edit the
scores (skill and evaluation) and transfer tokens. This role
is assigned to the instructor when (s)he is conducting the
exam and is withdrawn after the exam is over. The process
of assignment and withdrawal is actuated by the enrolment
contract.
2) Test: Test segment contains two SCs, exam factory
and exam, that are called when the examiner wants to
add a new exam to the blockchain. Once the contract is
added to the blockchain, functions such as enrolintest,
answermytest are called by the students to execute sim-
ilar operations. The (G∗, r∗, t∗) algorithm is implemented
and sends the computed marks to the exam contract, which
further distribute scores and rewards to the corresponding
users’ wallet. The ERC-20 token style, which is followed in
SkillCheck, allows the contracts to call the functions of each
other. However, these contract also have some private functions
which allow certain users to take specific actions, e.g., only
the examiner can take the final decisions on the grades.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based education
platform SkillCheck, which satisfies scalability, uniformity
of scores over multiple evaluators, and ensures honest effort
from the evaluators. We presented the detailed design of the
platform which is currently active internally in a university
network. As a future work, we would like to investigate if such
guarantees can be ensured in general peer-review setups.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
According to the model (§III-B2), the instructor may not
know the true yj values of each paper j. This is because
we assume that the student knows her yj perfectly and if
r∗j > yj , she does not raise a regrading request.4 Mechanism
〈G∗, r∗, t∗〉 will assume r∗j to be the true score and design
the evaluation scores accordingly when there is no regrading
request. The student asks for regrading only if r∗j < yj .
To prove Theorem 1, we show that the expected value of
tji is independent of bi and decreasing in σi :=
1
τi
. The final
grade after regrading is
max{r∗j (·), yj} = max{r∗j (·)− yj , 0}+ yj . (3)
We use the shorthand x = |Pi|,∀i ∈ M since this number is
a constant in our mechanism.
According to the PG1 model of Piech et al. [12], y˜
(i)
j =
yj + bi+nij , where nij ∼ N (0, 1/τi) is a noise term. Hence,
it is easy to show that bˆi = bi +
∑
k∈Pi nik
x and
1
τˆi
= σˆ2i =∑
k∈Pi (nik−
1
x
∑
nik)
2
x , where nik ∼ N (0, 1/τi).
Substituting these values we get the expression for
r∗j (·)− yj =
√
γ(µ− yj) +
∑
l∈G(j)
√
τˆl(nlj −
∑
k∈Pl nlk
x )√
γ +
∑
l∈G(j)
√
τˆl
.
With the assumption that yj is replaced with r∗j if not
regraded, we can find the condition on yj when the R(·, ·)
function is non-zero to be yj >
√
γµ+Z+
√
τˆi(nij−
∑
k∈Pi nik
x )√
γ ,
where Z =
∑
l∈G(j)\{i}
√
τˆl(nlj −
∑
k∈Pl nlk
x ). Note that
the RHS of the inequality is independent of σi. To find the
expected value of tji , we need to integrate it w.r.t. yj , the limits
of which is, therefore, independent of σi. By definition, the
W
(−i)∗
j component of t
j
i is independent of bias and reliability
of grader i. Hence, we only consider the first component which
is dependent on the bias and reliability of grader i. We will
consider the integral only w.r.t. yj to compute t
j
i and we just
showed that the limits of this integral is independent of σi. As
4It is natural that a student getting a higher score than her expectation will
not contest the grading.
R(r∗j , yj) is decreasing in |r∗j − yj |, if we show that |r∗j − yj |
is independent of bi and increasing in σi, then we are done.
It can be shown that
r∗j − yj =
=
Z−i
√∑
k∈Pi (mik−
1
x
∑
l∈Pi mil)
2
x · σi + σi · (mj − 1x
∑
l∈Pi mil)
X−i
√∑
k∈Pi (mik−
1
x
∑
l∈Pi mil)
2
x · σi + 1
In the last equality, we substituted Z−i = [
√
γ(µ −
yj) +
∑
l∈G(j)\{i}
√
τˆl(y˜
(l)
j − bˆl − yj)] and X−i = (
√
γ +∑
l∈G(j)\{i}
√
τˆl). Also, we substituted nik = mik · σi. Since
nik ∼ N (0, σ2i ), we get mik ∼ N (0, 1). We see that the
absolute value of the above expression is independent of bi
and increasing in σi.
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